Key Takeaways:
Diplomatic, economic and military aspects motivate Russia's attempts to increase involvement in Africa. Moscow likely aims to secure preferential access to critical resources and develop alliances on the southern flanks of NATO and the EU.
Russia’s ability to grow its economic influence is highly likely limited by domestic economic challenges and the lack of incentives for African countries to significantly increase trade with Russia. This presents a vacuum for Chinese and Western companies to exploit.
Over the next 10-15 years, KSG assesses that China will likely be the leading great-power in Africa. As a consequence, Chinese mining, finance, defence, energy, infrastructure and logistics companies will likely be making large sums, while Western companies struggle for market share.
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Background
The past decade has seen a resurgence in Russian efforts to increase its influence in Africa. Today, Moscow invokes the same anti-colonial messaging as the USSR, but rather than championing socialism, Russia promotes its paradigm of a “multipolar world order”, which would challenge “liberal globalisation” that has imposed a “Western [civilisational] model on the entire world”.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the Western sanctions imposed as a result have accelerated Russian efforts to become the key player in African politics; Moscow looks to strengthen the remaining economic partnerships at its disposal and show that it has not become a global pariah. The Kremlin’s pivot to Africa is evident when comparing Russia’s 2016 and (its latest) 2023 Foreign Policy Concepts – the 2023 version of the document refers to Africa as “a distinctive and influential centre of world development” and envisages a much higher degree of engagement with the continent through bilateral and multilateral partnerships than the previous iteration.
However, economic and geostrategic opportunities also underpin Russian diplomatic efforts to develop closer relationships with (non-aligned) African countries. Firstly, it is in Russia’s economic interest to secure preferential access to Africa’s vast critical mineral reserves, which contain over 50% of global cobalt, manganese, and platinum reserves. Secondly, it is in Russia’s geostrategic interest to cultivate allies on the southern flank of the EU and NATO and gain influence in the Mediterranean and Red Seas.
Russia-Africa Multilateral Diplomacy
Moscow has a significant political interest in securing neutrality (or, at best, support) from African countries for its war in Ukraine. The continent forms the largest regional voting bloc in the United Nations (UN), with 54/193 member-states part of The African Group; Moscow seeks to maintain the neutrality of the 25 nations, including Angola, Morocco, South Africa, and Ethiopia, that either abstained or did not vote, in the 2022 UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Support from African countries grants Russia a degree of legitimacy in its war in Ukraine; at a time when Russia is increasingly perceived as a pariah by the Global North, support from the Global South upholds (and reinforces) Russia’s political narrative of a fight against Western hegemony in the interest of multipolarity – in accordance with Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept.
However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 inflicted a substantial shock to existing food insecurities felt by many African countries, with higher global commodity prices putting upward pressure on domestic prices:
Russian and Ukrainian wheat accounted for 85% of Kenyan and 67% of Egyptian imports before 2022. However, Global cereal prices increased by 23.5 points in 2021-2022.
Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, Senegal, and South Africa sourced between 11% and 41% of fertiliser imports from Russia and Ukraine. Following the February 2022 invasion, the fertiliser price index increased by 73.05 points, reaching a 5-year peak in April 2022.
Therefore, with just over 20% of Africa’s population (approximately 282,800,000 people) facing hunger in 2023, Russia’s war in Ukraine poses an ongoing high-impact threat to food security on the continent. To avert a crisis, Türkiye and the UN quickly brokered the Black Sea grain initiative (BSGI) with Russia and Ukraine in July 2022, which ensured the safe export of 33 million metric tonnes of grain and foodstuffs from Ukraine and reduced global food prices by 23% from record highs in March 2022. However, after failed negotiations (in which Russia sought six concessions, including reconnection of its Agricultural Bank to SWIFT and lifting import sanctions on agricultural machinery), the initiative collapsed in July 2023.
At the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit, days after the collapse of the BSGI, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered 25,000-50,000 tonnes of free grain to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Eritrea to (once again) prevent a humanitarian crisis and the related risk of African countries turning against Russia in inter-governmental fora. In addition, Putin pledged to forgive $23 billion of debt owed by Ethiopia, Libya, Angola, and Somalia.
However, these incentives are unlikely to satisfy or engender non-pre-existing support from African nations, which are generally keen for Russia to re-enter the BSGI, as the deal provided requisite certainty and stability to grain imports. Such was made clear by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa at the Summit and is evident in a statement (a day after Putin’s pledge) by Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chair of the African Union Commission, that “the grain deal must be extended for the benefit of all the peoples of the world, Africans in particular”.
Moreover, the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit revealed a tepidity to Russia’s diplomatic efforts among many African leaders. The previous 2019 Russia-Africa Summit was attended by 43 (out of 54) African heads of state, whilst only 17 attended the 2023 Summit – Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters that this was due to “unconcealed brazen interference” by Western countries. Regardless, limited attendance by African heads of state highly likely signals that many African leaders were uncomfortable showing implicit support for Russia by attending the Summit, as almost half of African countries have opted for vocal non-alignment on Russia’s war in Ukraine, a sentiment likely compounded by Russia’s relatively limited economic offering to the continent.
Russian Economic Footprint
Fundamentally, there is limited upside for most African states in significantly increasing diplomatic (or economic) cooperation with Russia, as doing so would likely engender a political backlash from its much larger trading partners that actively oppose Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russia’s overall trade volume with Africa was around $18.4 billion in 2022 – however, this figure is heavily skewed by Russian exports, worth $16.14 billion. Taken in a broader context, Russia’s 2022 trade volume was under 10% of China’s ($199 billion) and far lower than France’s ($67.8 billion), the US’s ($65.4 billion), and the UAE’s ($50.46 billion). Furthermore, roughly 70% of Russia’s trade (with Africa) is concentrated in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and South Africa; this reinforces the limited scale of Russia’s economic influence across the wider continent, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Moreover, with Russia-Africa trade only reaching $25 billion in 2023, Russia is unlikely to deliver on its pledge made at the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit to double its annual trade volume with the continent within the next four to five years. Therefore, grand proclamations of deepening economic cooperation are – parallel to further diplomatic cooperation – unlikely to materialise on a large (continental) scale due partly to the aforementioned limited upside for African states, but also questions over whether domestic economic challenges in Russia may limit Russia’s capacity to increase trade with the continent substantially.
Arms Trade
Between 2018 and 2022, Russia was Africa’s largest arms supplier, providing 40% of the continent’s weaponry. Russian arms exports were concentrated in North Africa, with a 75% share of the Algerian market and directing 9.3% of its total arms exports to Egypt – making Cairo the third largest recipient of Russian arms. Russian exports to Sub-Saharan Africa were also significant, as Russia overtook China to become the region’s largest arms supplier, increasing its market share from 21% in 2013-2017 to 26% in 2018-2022.
However, the war in Ukraine has seriously denigrated Russia’s capacity to export arms due to a sharp increase in internal demand. Consequently, Russian arms exports to Africa fell by 16% in the continent as a whole and a more pronounced 44% in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2019-2023. Therefore, with this downturn highly likely to continue until the war in Ukraine ends and internal demand abates, Russia stands to lose significant standing in what was (before the war) one of its strongest arms export markets and main levers of influence over its recipients.
Oil and Gas Projects
Despite Russia’s overall foreign investment in Africa representing under 1% of the total investment going into the continent, Russian energy companies (wholly or partially state-owned) have made a number of strategically significant investments in African hydrocarbon and nuclear power projects.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, Russian companies are significant stakeholders in oil and gas projects across Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, and the Republic of Congo. However, of primary strategic significance are Rosneft, Gazprom, Lukoil, and Tatneft’s North African projects across Libya, Algeria, and Egypt. While geospatial analysis has shown that Rosneft and Gazprom’s Algerian projects have encountered operational difficulties, the remaining projects in Libya and Egypt are on schedule.
Russian involvement in Libyan oil and gas projects is highly significant due to the nation’s strategically important location in the central Mediterranean (on the southern flank of NATO and the EU) and the ongoing security crisis following the Libyan civil war. Russian investments in this space are highly likely part of a broader strategy, alongside the operations of the Wagner Group (now Africa Corps), to consolidate its presence in Libya and across North Africa.
Egypt is also of geostrategic importance given its control over the Suez Canal and location astride key air routes connecting European air bases to West and Southern Africa. Therefore, Russian investments in Egyptian oil and gas extraction are likely incentivised by a perceived opportunity to drive a wedge between (and gain leverage over) a major US partner that links the Middle East and North Africa. The Suez Canal is also fundamental to the US's ability to move forces across theatres quickly, let alone global prosperity in general.
Oil Exports
Rather than leading to a surge in Russian investment into Africa-based oil and gas projects, the war in Ukraine has engendered a surge in Russian oil exports to Africa. Having lost access to Western markets due to sanctions on its fossil fuels, Russia has turned to alternative export markets in Asia and Africa to continue its crucial export business.
Consequently, Russian exports of refined oil products to Africa increased by 14 times in 2022, with the majority of this being gasoline destined for Tunisia, Nigeria, Morocco, Libya, and Egypt. This market trend has continued into 2024, but with Senegal emerging as the largest African (and fourth largest global) importer of Russian oil products. Similarly, Russian crude exports to Africa have increased by 144% since 2022, as cheap Urals crude undercuts Dated Brent by around $20 a barrel.
The steep increase in Russian oil exports to Africa is driven primarily – as with crude exports to India and China – by the discount placed on Russian products due to international sanctions and the loss of Western markets. However, despite the significant increase in Russian oil exports to the continent, Africa still ranks far below Russia’s main export markets: India, China, and Turkey.
Nuclear Power Projects
Nuclear energy is Russia’s most significant sphere of cooperation with Egypt, and potentially with other African countries. ROSATOM, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company, received its permit to begin constructing the El Dabaa nuclear power plant (NPP) in June 2022; the plant is expected to be operational by 2030, and Russia will finance 85% ($25 billion) of the construction cost through a state loan.
Similar to ROSATOM’s Akkuyu NPP in Türkiye, the reactors will have an operational lifespan of 60 years, possibly extending to 80 years. While the El Dabaa NPP isn’t strictly a build-own-operate (BOO) model like the Akkuyu NPP, contracts for the Egyptian NPP stipulate that Russia will provide reactor fuel for the entire lifecycle of the NPP and operational support for the first ten years.
Therefore, the El Dabaa NPP gives Russia significant leverage over Egypt through its critical energy infrastructure into the next century. This leverage could potentially be exercised to push Egypt to provide Russia with military equipment for use in Ukraine. Moreover, Egypt ranks as the second most vulnerable country (in the world) to a sovereign debt crisis, further heightening its vulnerability to Russian influence in the scenario that Cairo struggles (or fails) to repay Russia’s $25 billion loan.
The start of construction for the El Dabaa NPP is highly significant as it marks ROSATOM’s first African NPP, delivering a tangible result from one of the (over 20) nuclear cooperation agreements signed by ROSATOM across the continent, thus demonstrating that ROSATOM is capable of delivering large-scale foreign infrastructure projects. Furthermore, ROSATOM is making significant progress in supporting nuclear research and training across Morocco and Uganda, where reactors may be operational by around 2030, and Rwanda, which may have domestic nuclear power by 2050.
However, financing remains a significant hurdle, requiring substantial investment from public and private sector actors, which is in short supply following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine; private investors are likely hesitant to invest significant capital in projects linked to the Russian state (due to reputational and sanctions-related concerns), while Russia’s capacity to dispense capital across foreign infrastructure projects has been substantially weakened by the economic pressures of its war in Ukraine.
Mining and the Africa Corps
Russian mining entities have significant investments in a number of metal and mineral concessions across Africa. Russian concessions are concentrated in weak institutional environments and authoritarian states, such as Sudan, Guinea, the CAR, and Mozambique; however, Russian miners also have notable stakes in Namibian uranium and South African nickel and manganese.
However, Russia’s presence in Africa’s mining sector is deeply linked to the activities of Russian PMCs, with the largest being the Africa Corps (AC) – formerly known as the Wagner Group. The Wagner Group model fundamentally relied on securing payment for security services through direct mining concessions, particularly in gold. However, following the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the Russian Defence Ministry subsumed (and renamed) the PMC, placing it under the supervision of state military and intelligence structures. Consequently, the AC operates in full coherence with the Kremlin’s economic and geopolitical strategic priorities, whereas its predecessor enjoyed higher operational and strategic autonomy.
The AC has around 6000 personnel and is currently militarily active in Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the CAR – maintaining a limited presence in Sudan and having previously operated in Mozambique as the Wagner Group. The PMC provides physical security and military support against insurgent groups while securing trade routes and resources beneficial to Russian strategic interests – Russia has earned over $2.5 billion from African ‘blood gold’ through Wagner and the AC. Furthermore, the AC provides a range of ‘political advisory’ services, including a significant propaganda capability (now overseen by the Russian Federal Security Service’s Fifth Service) that proliferates disinformation campaigns across the continent supporting AC clients.
The activities of Russian PMCs pose a significant threat to Western (particularly French and US) interests (particularly in Sahelian states) as their influence serves to displace Western security providers and mining companies while driving regional conflict and instability through their support of authoritarian leaders.
Africa Corps Strategic Priorities
The AC’s primary strategic focus is in the Sahel, where Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso signed a confederation treaty in July 2024, forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) after withdrawing from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January. Research from the Polish Institute of International Affairs has shown that since the creation of the AC, the organisation has shifted its strategic focus (under Wagner) from operations in the CAR and Sudan to the AES states, where junta governments (which came to power in coups between 2020-2023) are seeking military support to consolidate power and tackle jihadist insurgent groups after expelling French and US troops. The shift of these Sahelian states away from ECOWAS and the West (while inviting the AC) significantly denigrates French and US influence in the Sahel and reinforces democratic erosion in these states – further compounded by their confederation under the AES.
Thus, following the signing of bilateral defence agreements and a series of official visits by foreign minister Sergey Lavrov and deputy defence minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov, the Africa Corps deployed initial contingents of 100 soldiers to each Burkina Faso and Niger in January and April 2024. These initial contingents will almost certainly increase over the next year, as was signalled by Lavrov in June 2024. However, in Mali, the AC inherited a significant Wagner Group presence that had been operating in support of authorities against Islamic insurgent groups and Tuareg separatist groups since December 2021 – examining Wagner activities in Mali indicates the likely economic trajectory of new AC operations in Burkina Faso and Niger.
Wagner Group’s military operations in Mali were supplemented by the creation of Wagner-affiliated ‘local’ mining companies – Alpha Development, Marko Mining, and Prime Security – to secure mining licences for the PMC. Wagner primarily sought to exploit Malian gold mining, with the Sahelian nation being Africa’s third-largest gold producer. Wagner hoped to displace international mining firms (such as Barrick) through its subsidiaries and gain preferential access to Malian gold. However, Wagner was largely unsuccessful in this objective, as the international mining companies operating in Mali were long established and contributed substantial sums (around $588 million in 2022) to the Malian state in tax revenues, which enabled the junta to meet Wagner’s reported $10 million monthly fee in cash.
While Wagner’s economic strategy was ultimately unsuccessful in Mali due to the entrenchment and profitability of international mining companies, the same strategy successfully secured concessions in Sudan and the CAR. For example, in the CAR, Wagner-affiliated corporations gained significant concessions in diamond and gold mining after the CAR government transferred control of the Ndassima gold mine (worth around $1 billion) to Midas Resources (a Wagner-affiliated corporation) in 2020 in exchange for ongoing military support since 2017. Ndassima is of particular significance as the mine was previously owned and operated by AXMIN, a Canadian company. AXMIN has subsequently sought international arbitration against the CAR for its supposedly unlawful transfer of the mine to Midas, following AXMIN’s abandonment of the site in 2013 after it was taken over by rebels. This example illuminates the significant threat to international investors in the host countries of AC forces, as the group is highly likely to exploit its leverage over weak governments to displace existing stakeholders and secure preferential access to resources.
However, with the Wagner Group’s subsummation into Russian military and intelligence command structures, KSG assesses that the AC is likely to act as an arm to secure investment opportunities for Russian state corporations across a more diversified (and advanced) set of commodities rather than focusing on the common barter goods (gold and diamonds) sought by the private enterprises affiliated with Prigozhin.
Therefore, of immediate concern is Niger’s uranium mining sector. Nigerien uranium accounts for 25% of EU uranium imports, and French companies primarily own its mines; Niger’s decision to revoke Orano’s mining license in June 2024 suggests that there is a significant likelihood that Niger will look to remove more Western firms from its uranium sector in favour of cooperation with ROSATOM as ties with Russia continue to deepen and anti-French sentiments become further entrenched.
Looking Forward:
KSG assesses that Russian political and economic influence in Africa is unlikely to gain traction beyond states with already weak institutional environments due to Russia’s relatively limited economic offering and the diplomatic downsides of closer cooperation with Moscow.
Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet have effectively reopened the Black Sea Grain Corridor and wider market trends suggest a decline in food prices through 2024. These developments alleviate food insecurity, which removes one of the key incentives for many African leaders in seeking closer diplomatic cooperation with Moscow.
Therefore, the first Ministerial Conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum (which will be held in November 2024) is unlikely to deliver tangible outcomes due to an emerging cautiousness among many African leaders in their engagements with Russia.
KSG assesses that China will almost certainly experience long-term economic benefits from Russia’s decreased market share in arms exports.
China will likely substantially increase its market share among African nations, such as Zimbabwe and Sudan, which are keen to maintain the high cost-to-quality ratio ostensibly provided by Russian weaponry and are unwilling to purchase Western arms with political contingencies. Consequently, KSG assessess that Western influence will further diminish in these countries.
Chinese arms are often offered alongside alternative financing options, such as Chinese suppliers accepting barter goods (for example, Zambian copper) and offering soft loans. Such financing options are a key part of China’s broader strategy to expand its economic and political influence across Africa.
Therefore, increased Chinese arms exports to Africa are highly likely to undermine Russia’s diplomatic push in Africa, in addition to Russia’s prospects for regaining its market share once internal demand abates.
Western sanctions have already had an adverse effect on Russia’s official mining operations in Africa, and these effects are likely to worsen.
There is a realistic possibility that more expansive sanctions targeting Russian mining entities could ultimately lead to solvency issues that would force Russian miners to liquidate and sell their concessions at a discounted valuation.
This scenario presents an opportunity for Western investors to make lucrative investments in critical mineral concessions that would likely serve to balance increasing Chinese influence in African extractive industries.
KSG assesses that Russian oil and gas companies are unlikely to gain a significant foothold in the African market, both in terms of exports and involvement in future extraction projects.
Russian exports will likely benefit from positive demographic trends and projected economic growth, which will increase African demand for Russian products over the next 5-10 years.
However, Russian exporters will face growing competition from Africa’s domestic producers as the African Union is working to expand intra-African oil and gas trade. This trend will likely prevent a significant increase in Russian oil and gas exports in the longer term.
Prospects for a significant increase in Russian involvement in African oil and gas production projects are highly limited. This is due to the Kremlin’s current fiscal constraints, concerns over exposure to sanctions among potential partners, and the need to prioritise the construction of infrastructure that facilitates the export of Russian oil and gas to its much bigger markets in Asia.
If delivered, KSG assesses that ROSATOM’s nuclear power projects would grant Russia significant economic-political leverage over African states.
However, despite the growing number of nuclear cooperation agreements with African countries, few ROSATOM projects will likely materialise due to their inherently high costs, the financial constraints in Russia, and the likely hesitance of private investors due to sanctions-related and reputational concerns.
Financial constraints are compounded by strong competition from the China National Nuclear Corporation, which has recently signed a deal to assist Uganda in developing its first NPP – in accordance with China’s broader strategy to expand its civilian nuclear cooperation with African countries.
African countries are more likely to turn to China for assistance in developing domestic NPPs. Beijing is better positioned to provide the requisite financing and does not carry the same political downsides as cooperation with Russia.
The expansion of AC activities poses the most significant risk to the security interests of the EU and NATO governments, as well as Western extractive firms operating in Africa.
However, AC military operations are currently unlikely to spread beyond their current confinement to the Sahel (and Libya) due to the group’s reliance on invitations from authoritarian leaders in institutionally weak states with insurgency-related security concerns.
KSG assesses that Chad is the most likely African nation to experience AC expansion in the near future.
The ascent of Mahamat Idriss Déby to power following a coup in 2021 and high insurgency risks mirrors similar situations in the other Sahelian states that preceded the involvement of the AC or Wagner.
Déby conducted bilateral talks with Putin in January 2024, and in April 2024, the head of the Chadian air force ordered US forces to halt activities at the Adji Kossei Air Base. While the US negotiates with alternative regional partners, the removal of US troops from Chad will likely temporarily inhibit US-led counter-insurgency operations in the Sahel and West Africa.
These developments suggest that the new Chadian government is highly likely to seek closer cooperation with Russia and the AES, moving away from ECOWAS and Western partners, with there being a realistic possibility that Déby’s government will seek to remove French forces and invite the AC in the next year.
Notwithstanding limitations to the AC’s potential military expansion, the PMC’s current posture already poses a significant geostrategic threat to NATO and the EU.
The AC’s significant presence in Libya enables Russia to potentially exercise a limited degree of influence over the Mediterranean Sea; however, Russia has reportedly been pushing for the construction of a naval base in Libya since 2023.
Although a Russian naval base in Libya is unlikely in the near future, a Libyan base would pose a significant threat to NATO and the EU, as Russia could leverage Libya’s strategic location to threaten NATO critical infrastructure with long-range missile strikes and actively interfere with shipping through the Mediterranean.
Moreover, Russia’s growing presence in Libya and the Sahel creates an opportunity for Moscow to weaponise trans-Saharan migrant flows to destabilise EU countries – mirroring Russia and Belarus’ strategy on the EU’s eastern flank in pushing irregular migrant flows towards EU borders.
Regardless of whether the AC successfully expands its military operations across Africa over the next two years, KSG assesses that the group is highly likely to (continue to) proliferate disinformation campaigns across the continent.
Under the direction of the Federal Security Service’s highly experienced Fifth Service, the AC’s propaganda function is highly likely to intensify efforts to erode trust in democratic institutions and amplify anti-Western sentiments through disinformation campaigns targeting African citizens.
Such campaigns are likely to foster civil instability and create grassroots support for increasing cooperation with Russia, which poses a significant threat to Western interests across Africa.
China is highly likely to continue developing closer economic and political ties with African countries, outcompeting Russian attempts to increase influence across the continent, creating a realistic possibility of political friction between Moscow and Beijing.
Following the September 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), KSG assessed that China and Africa will likely successfully deepen collaboration, with Chinese investments playing a key role in Africa’s future industrial diversification and technological development.
KSG assesses that Russia’s increasingly limited influence in Africa will escalate the probability of China successfully growing its economic and political influence on the continent. The 2022 war in Ukraine has significantly denigrated Russia’s capacity to serve as an alternative partner in infrastructure projects and supplier of military equipment, while China is in an advantageous position to meet these demands through its Belt and Road Initiative and growing arms export business.
Over the next 10-15 years, KSG wargaming demonstrated the high likelihood that China would be the leading great-power in Africa, with significantly more influence on the continent. As a consequence, Chinese mining, finance, defence, energy, infrastructure and logistics companies would be making large sums, while Western companies struggled for market share.